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July 2004 Abstract 
 
Child labor is widespread and bad for development, both that of the individual child 
and of the society and economy in which she or he lives. If allowed to persist to the current 
extent, child labor will prevent the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals of 
halving poverty and achieving Education for All. Nearly all of the world’s governments have 
ratified international human rights conventions which call for the elimination of child labor 
and the provision of universal primary education. Fulfilling these commitments is of critical 
importance for development.  
 
This paper  reviews the international legal framework relating to child labor and 
access to education and provides a statistical portrait of child labor and education 
participation. It looks at why children work from the perspective of household decision-
making. Various policy options are considered, including those which improve the incentives 
to education relative to labor, remove constraints to schooling, and increase education 
participation through legislation. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. Child Labor, Education, and Children’s Rights 
 
Gordon Betcherman, Jean Fares, Amy Luinstra, and Robert Prouty
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“Nonetheless, if the fundamental rights behind our cause are not sufficient to move people to 
act, then let it be the economic and social rationale behind it. Either way, we are going to 
challenge people to act.” 
Nelson Mandela and Graca Machel, in calling for a  





Over 200 million children between 5 and 14 years of age are working world-wide. 
This figure represents one-fifth of  the total population of girls and boys in this age group. 
About 111 million children are in what has been termed as “hazardous work” which refers to 
forms of labor which are likely to have adverse effects on the child’s safety, health, and 
moral development. Nearly 10 million of these children are engaged in some form of slave 
labor, armed conflict, prostitution or pornography, or other illicit activities. Some observers 
believe that these figures understate the real magnitude of child labor. 
The implications of this situation are significant, complex, and multidimensional. The 
hazardous and worst forms of child labor are of universal concern, given the obvious harm 
that they inflict on the lives of these children and their possibilities for a hopeful future. Child 
labor also has important economic implications. Most notable are the substantial future 
income losses that working children will incur because of the negative consequences working 
will have on their human capital, including their health and education.  Since children are 
more likely to work and not go to school if their parents worked as children, the economic 
losses associated with child labor and their implications for poverty are often transmitted 
across generations.  
Studies have concluded that eliminating child labor and putting these children into 
education would have huge aggregate developmental benefits. Gains would primarily be 
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through the added productive capacity of future generations that had the benefit of education, 
as opposed to having worked as children. Very recently, the ILO (2004) has published 
estimates that the discounted present value of this economic gain would be in the order of 
US$5 trillion over the 2000-2020 period. While such a calculation is inherently imprecise, 
any plausible set of assumptions would yield a very large benefit, far in excess of the costs 
that would be incurred. Of course, in addition to the economic argument, there are 
compelling, if difficult-to-quantify, moral concerns with the worst forms of child labor, as 
noted above.  
As the international community rallies around the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDGs) as a comprehensive vision for development, child labor, stands as a serious obstacle 
to achieving a number of the goals including poverty reduction. Most directly, child labor has 
obvious implications for meeting the goal of universal primary education. In April 2000, the 
international community committed to Education For All (EFA), a partnership to achieve 
education for every citizen in every society. This initiative will not meet its objectives by 
focusing only on the education system itself. Because of its implications for schooling, child 
labor must be addressed if the rights to education at the heart of EFA are implemented 
meaningfully. 
Child labor, of course, has already received considerable attention. Most countries 
have long had prescriptive legislation as well as compulsory education laws. At the 
international level, child labor has been the focus of various conventions and 
recommendations. Most significant have been the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) and two ILO conventions, the Minimum Age Convention (No. 138, 1973) and the 
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182, 1999). In promoting children’s rights, 
each of these instruments – in very different ways -- has been motivated by an interest in 
protecting children from exploitation through their labor and providing for education as a 
preferable alternative.  
As Myers (2001) has argued, the content of these conventions reflects an evolution in 
thinking within the international community about how children’s rights should be applied to 
child labor and education. Starting from a Euro/American-centric view of the meaning of 
childhood which dominated the international debate for much of the 20
th century, the   3
Convention on the Rights of the Child and, even more so, the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention reflect a recognition that child labor is a complex phenomenon, with various 
forms, diverse underlying causes, and different meanings in different cultural contexts. 
Understanding these realities sharpens the discussion on child labor and builds consensus on 
appropriate responses. It would be difficult for any concerned individual or organization to 
not support the goal of Convention 182 to eliminate children working in the unconditional 
worst forms (slavery, prostitution, armed conflict, drug trafficking, etc.) or in work that is 
unsafe, unhealthy, or hazardous to mental, emotional, and physical development. 
However, while consensus may have been established against the very visible forms 
of child labor targeted by Convention 182, these do not describe the work life for tens of 
millions of working children. The reality is quite complicated. The vast majority of child 
workers are involved in agricultural work, typically in family-run farms. In Africa, where the 
incidence of child labor is highest, rural children are at least twice as likely to be working as 
urban children. A significant proportion of working children are enrolled in school as well, 
although there is a lot of evidence confirming the adverse impact of child labor on 
educational achievement.  
Reflecting this complex reality, addressing child labor and, thus, achieving universal 
education goals requires complex approaches. E ffective policy responses depend “upon 
recognizing that most children work with or for their parents in economies where markets are 
underdeveloped and the legal and political infrastructure is thin” (Bhalotra and Tzannatos, 
2003: 54).  Understanding household decision-making  and the incentives and constraints 
facing families  is essential, then, to comprehend why child labor exists and to consider 
interventions that can effectively address the underlying causes. 
It is true that the incidence of child labor is associated with poverty, so policies that 
alleviate poverty are likely to have beneficial outcomes. However, empirical research in 
recent years has shown that the relationship between poverty and child labor is weaker than 
is often believed. Other forces clearly come into play. For example, children may work 
because the economic returns to working may be greater than returns they would be able to 
accrue in low-quality, inaccessible schools. Or families in vulnerable situations may put 
children to work because they need the immediate benefits of their labor due to lack of access   4
to credit instruments or social safety nets. These situations require multi-sectoral approaches 
that can involve, at a minimum, education, social protection, and health interventions, as well 
as enforcing compulsory education and child labor regulations.  This comprehensive 
approach reinforces children’s rights and solidifies the efforts to achieve a broad range of 
goals set by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
In the next section, we review the international legal framework relating to child labor 
and access to education. In Section 3, we present a statistical portrait of child labor and 
educational participation. Section 4 looks at why children work from the perspective of 
household decision-making. In Section 5, we consider policy options, discussing how 
interventions can improve the incentives to education relative to labor, remove constraints to 
schooling, and increase education participation through legislation. Conclusions are drawn in 
the final section.  
2. Human Rights Instruments 
As noted above, the principal international legal instruments for addressing child 
labor include the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) which covers both child 
labor and the right to education and two ILO conventions, the Minimum Age Convention 
(No. 138, 1973) and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182, 1999). The UN 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and C ultural Rights also address the right to education but the above-listed 
instruments provide more detail and are commonly seen as the key international instruments 
for addressing children’s rights. These instruments are summarized in Table 1. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the ILO child labor 
conventions have received widespread international support, the former being ratified by 192 
countries – all U.N. members, in fact, save the United States and Somalia. ILO Convention 
182, prioritizing action against the worst forms of child labor, was the first convention 
adopted unanimously and has been the most rapidly ratified convention in the organization’s 
85-year history.    5
Table 1: International Human Rights Instruments Related to Education and Child 
Labor 
 
Title  Date  Ratified  Provisions (Articles) 
Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights 
1948  N/A  Right to Education (26) 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) 
1966  148  Compulsory and free primary education 
(13) 
ILO Convention 138: Minimum 
Age  
1973  131  Minimum Age of 15; exceptions for 
LDCs and “light work.” Consolidated 
and replaced earlier CL conventions. 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) 
1989  192  Freedom of association (15); primary 
education; (28) rest and leisure (31); no 
hazardous child labor (32); protection 
from sexual exploitation (34) and 
trafficking (35) 
ILO Convention 182: Worst 
Forms of Child Labor  
1999  147  Ban slavery, use in armed conflict,  
prostitution, drug trade; Work harmful 
to health safety, morals. 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.un.org/rights/) and 
International Labour Organization (www.ilo.org) 
* As of February, 2004. 
 
While widely supported, international human rights laws related to children do have 
limitations. Negotiated by governments (and, in the case of the ILO, social partners), they are 
the result of political consensus. They reflect what governments and interest groups could 
agree on, not n ecessarily what experts believe should be done. Once adopted by the 
international bodies, individual countries voluntarily decide to ratify and apply the 
convention in their national laws. While the international system provides mechanisms for 
oversight and monitoring, there are no international enforcement provisions; ratifying 
countries are responsible for enforcing their own laws. Some bilateral trade agreements, 
however, do refer to ILO conventions and provide options for sanctions. Despite these 
limitations, international conventions provide important standards or points of reference for 
developing national policy as well as benchmarks against which national policies and 
interventions can be monitored and assessed. 
Standards for child labor and education policy are established with varying degree of 
specificity in the three key instruments under discussion. ILO Convention 138 is the most   6
specific international instrument pertaining to child labor. When adopted in 1973, it replaced 
ten previous ILO conventions referring to minimum working age in various industries. 
Unlike the CRC, this convention does not refer to children as having rights; the purpose is 
simply to establish a minimum age at which they ought to be allowed to work. That age is set 
to 15 or not less than the end of compulsory schooling, with an exception for developing 
countries of 14. There are also exceptions for light work, defined as work which is not 
harmful to a child’s health and development and which does not prejudice school attendance 
or participation in vocational training nor the capacity to benefit from the instruction 
received. Light work is allowed for ages 13-15, or 12-14 in developing countries. Hazardous 
work is to be generally banned for children under 18 but conditionally allowed at 16 if 
adequate protection and training is provided.  
Convention 138 has been criticized for promoting a Euro-American view of children 
and childhood (Myers, 2001).  Critics note that it promotes a concept of an  “ideal childhood” 
as one free of r esponsibilities, including work, and dominated by education and leisure 
within the family context. Ethnographers in various cultural contexts point to different 
models and realities of childhood (Baker and Hinton, 2001). A developed-country bias is also 
evident in the assumptions made about the institutional framework for implementation: a 
well-functioning labor inspectorate operating in primarily industrial settings; an adequate 
legal system; and compulsory, accessible, and quality education  
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child was an ambitious attempt to 
safeguard the rights of children. In contrast to the ILO Minimum Age Convention, the CRC 
articulates principles and objectives, giving broad scope to states to choose policy 
interventions that b est fit their situation (Myers, 2001). The CRC establishes a right to 
education, acknowledging that fulfilling this right must be achieved progressively. It calls on 
states to make primary education compulsory and free and encourages the development of 
secondary education, including vocational training. Under the CRC, governments ought to 
take measures to ensure regular attendance and the reduction of drop-outs. International 
cooperation to support developing countries in meeting these obligations is encouraged. 
The CRC also includes provisions related to child labor, including much of the 
language later adopted in the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The CRC   7
focuses on protecting children from work that may harm “their physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral, or social development.” There is no blanket provision against children working, 
thereby acknowledging the reality of families in poor countries who may rely on their 
children’s work, particularly in agriculture. The CRC also breaks new ground in establishing 
the principle of acting in the best interests of the child (Article 3) and, importantly, giving the 
child who is capable of forming views, the right to express them in all matters affecting the 
child (Article 12). 
In 1999, the ILO adopted the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, calling on all 
governments to take “immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency.” The worst forms 
identified by the Convention include slavery, trafficking, prostitution, and work likely to 
harm the health, safety, or morals of the children. An accompanying Recommendation (190) 
offers guidelines on what types of work may be considered hazardous, although the 
responsibility for defining such rests with national governments. The Convention also calls 
for special attention to the situation of girls.  
Convention 182 has received acclaim for achieving consensus between developed and 
developing countries, as well as among practitioners, advocates, and academics. It is largely 
viewed as having avoided Euro-American bias, incorporating relativist principles even as it 
established monitorable responsibilities for signatories. A strong consensus on C182 has 
fueled mobilization of significant resources aimed at eliminating the worst forms of child 
labor.  
The promotion of children’s participation and empowerment in the CRC and C182 
reflects a key contribution of the rights-based approach to development more broadly. This 
approach, which has been adopted by a number of bilateral and multilateral development 
organizations, emphasizes the participation of poor people in development; social inclusion 
and equal access for all; and supporting governments in meeting their obligations under 
international law (Department for International Development, 2000). Rights-based 
approaches expand development objectives beyond physical assets and income growth, 
thereby promoting a wider range of possible policy interventions. By placing the interests of 
the child first and seeking ways to involve children and families in solutions, the CRC and   8
C182 allow for complexity in understanding the phenomenon of child labor as it varies by 
location, cultural context, and sector.  
3. Basic Statistics and Stylized Facts 
In reviewing the incidence and severity of child labor, this section addresses three 
important questions: What is child labor? How prominent is it around the world? And what is 
the current state of knowledge regarding its key determinants? 
While it seems straightforward, the definition of child labor is not simple and can be 
controversial.  At the basis of this debate is the fact that child labor (unlike adult labor) is not 
only defined by the activity but also by its consequences.  The age definition, subject to a 
lesser controversy, is guided by the UN CRC and covers all children less than 18 years old.  
However, this definition does not reflect culture-specific experiences relating to when 
children start to make their own decisions and/or when they are no longer part of their 
parents’ household.   
The definition of “labor” is subject to considerable debate.  The broadest definition 
includes all children involved in any form of economic activity (for at least one hour during 
the reference week), encompassing most productive activities by children.
2  Because some of 
these activities fall within acceptable social and cultural norms, a distinction is made among 
various types of work.  ILO Convention 138 (Art. 7), for example, stipulates that “light 
work” should (a) not be harmful to a child’s health and development and (b) should not 
prejudice attendance at school and participation in vocational training, nor the capacity to 
benefit from the instruction received.  As we have already seen, the ILO also identifies 
activities that are hazardous, and unconditional worst forms of child labor.  In several 
instances, disagreement about these definitions has postponed the ratification of ILO 
conventions. 
According to the child labor statistics published by ILO’s International Program on 
the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), in 2000 an estimated 211 million children aged 5-14 
years, and 140 million children aged 15-17 years old were engaged in some form of 
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economic activity (Table 2). Of this total number of children involved in economic activity, 
there are around 245 million in child labor, according to the ILO definition, including 170.5 
million children engaged in hazardous work.
3  In addition to the number of children in 
hazardous work, it is estimated that about 8.4 million children are involved in unconditional 
worst forms of child labor as defined by the ILO Convention 182.  These children, including 
the sexually exploited and child soldiers (Box 1), are the most vulnerable and need special 
and urgent attention. 
Table 2: Children in Economic Activities, 2000  
  Levels 
(Millions) 
% of  
Total  
% in Total Child 
Population 
5—14 Years Old  211    17.6 
Industrialized economies  2.5  1  2 
Transition economies  2.4  1  4 
       
Asia and the Pacific  127.3  60  19 
Latin America & Caribbean  17.4  8  16 
Sub Saharan Africa  48  23  29 
Middle East /North Africa  13.4  6  15 
       
15—17 Years Old  140    42.4 
Industrialized economies  11.5  8.1  31.3 
Transition economies  6.0  4.2  29.1 
       
Asia and the Pacific  86.9  61.7  48.4 
Latin America & Caribbean  10.3  7.3  25.0 
Sub Saharan Africa  18.1  12.8  44.8 
Middle East /North Africa  7.5  5.3  31.8 
       
Total   351    23.0 
Source: ILO (2002) 
 
The distribution of working children aged 5-14 years old varies significantly across 
regions.  As shown in Table 2, Asia-Pacific has the largest number (127 million), while Sub 
Saharan Africa has the highest incidence (29% of children are in child labor).  For children 
                                                 
3The ILO estimates of child labor refer to all economically active children less than 12 years old; children 
between 12 and 14 who are performing non-light work;  children between 15 and 17 working in hazardous 
occupations (e.g. mines, sporting goods and garments, glass bangles, matches and fireworks, carpet looms, 
tanning leather, breaking stones in quarries, street vendors and porters, polishing surgical instruments, making 
bricks, working on garbage dumps); and unconditional forms of child labor (e.g. trafficking, sexual exploitation, 
child soldiers, all such activities with direct harm to health, safety and moral of children.)   10 
aged 15—17 years old, Asia and the Pacific has the largest number of working children and 
the highest incidence of child labor.  
 
Box 1: Child Soldiers 
 
More than 300,000 children under 18 are fighting in armed conflicts in over 30 
countries worldwide. Of that total, approximately 120,000 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
While the majority of child soldiers are between the ages of 15 and 18, children as 
young as 7 or 8 years old are known to participate in armed conflicts. 
 
The "forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict" is 
recognized as one of the worst forms of child labor under ILO Convention 182.  The 
UN Optional Protocol on the Use of Children in Armed Conflict raises the minimum 
compulsory recruitment age to 18 for service in State Party armed forces. It also calls 
on ratifying governments to work to ensure that members of their armed forces who 
are under 18 do not take direct part in hostilities, and it promotes international 
cooperation in the rehabilitation and social integration of victims of acts contrary to the 
protocol.  The immediate challenges to address this problem are: 
 
•  PREVENTION: Any action to prevent the recruitment and use of children in 
armed groups must be based on a sound understanding of the children's situation in 
the specific context in which recruitment is taking place;  
•  DEMOBILIZATION: Prior to demobilization, child soldiers must be disarmed, 
which entails assembling combatants and collecting the weapons used within the 
conflict zone. Demobilization refers to the process by which parties in a conflict 
begin to disband their military structure, and combatants begin their reintegration 
into civilian life;  
•  REINTEGRATION:  Children are inevitably returning to an environment 
profoundly affected by war. Families may have changed; communities may be 
hostile to the former combatants; schools may be closed or destroyed; and families 
may have limited access to income-generating opportunities. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, International Child  
Labor Program 
 
In general, child labor takes two forms: unpaid work in the household or in the family 
farm/enterprise, and paid work in the labor market.  The vast majority of working children 
are in agriculture work, typically on family-run farms.  For example, in Africa, the incidence 
of child labor is at least twice as high in rural areas. (See Table 4 below.) 
In recent years, there has been a growing literature describing the patterns of child 
labor and its causes and consequences. To illustrate some key dimensions of child labor,  we 
briefly summarize the empirical findings on gender; income, and education.   11 
•  Boys are more likely to be engaged in economic activity than girls, with the gender gap 
frequently substantial.  However, this varies across regions and depending on the 
definition used.  Table 3 shows how boys’ involvement in child labor a s well as 
hazardous work exceeds that of girls.  
Table 3: Gender Distribution of Child Labor, Children  
Aged 5—14 Years Old, 2000 
  Levels 
(Millions) 
% of  
Total  
% in Total Child 
Population 
Child Labor   186.3    15.5 
       
Boys  97.8  52.5  15.9 
Girls  88.5  47.5  15.2 
       
Hazardous Work   111.3    9.3 
       
Boys  61.3  55  9.9 
Girls  50.0  45  8.5 
       
Total   211  100  17.6 
Source: ILO (2002) 
 
These global estimates are supported by regional evidence.  For example, in 11 of 15 
countries included in a Latin American study, boys’ economic activity rate was at least 
double that of girls, and in five, boys’ economic activity rate was three times as great. These 
estimates, however, do not, consider household chores, which are technically non-economic 
activities and therefore outside the ”production boundary”, according the UN System of 
National Accounts (1993 Rev. 3).   
Indeed, since responsibility for household chores typically falls disproportionately on 
girls in most countries, estimates of involvement in work based solely on economic activity 
are likely to understate girls’ participation in work relative to that of boys.  Table 4 shows 
that in Africa, the incidence of girls involved in household chores is 50% higher than boys.  
In fact, once we include household chores in the child work definition, the gender gap in 
children’s work disappears.   12 
Table 4: Distribution of children in Africa, by Category of Activity 















Age           
5-9 years  13.7  8.9  28.1  18.1  31.2 
10-14 years  20.5  32.8  33.7  9.3  3.7 
Gender           
Male  16.1  21.0  31.0  11.5  20.4 
Female  17.6  19.3  30.5  16.6  16.0 
Sector           
Urban  9.5  14.7  46.5  12.2  17.0 
Rural  19.8  21.8  24.9  14.6  19.0 
Income quintile           
Poorest  23.2  19.3  21.0  16.3  20.3 
Richest  7.4  16.1  50.6  10.8  15.1 
Mother’s Education        
Formal  11.3  20.5  36.0  13.4  18.7 
No Formal  20.9  19.7  23.8  15.9  19.8 
 
Total  16.9  20.1  30.7  14.1  18.2 
Sources: UNICEF. MICS, DHS. Sample includes 18 countries. 
Notes: (a) The UNICEF definition of child work applies (economic activity or 4 or more hours of 
household chores per day); (b) - The category “only HH chores” is for children spending less than 4 
hours on household chores per day 
 
•  Cross-country evidence displays a negative relationship between the incidence of child 
labor and income; on the other hand, evidence from household data shows a weak 
correlation between child labor and household income.  Figure 1 displays a clear drop in 
the incidence of child labor as GDP per capita increases for low-income countries.  
However, the evidence also indicates a non-linear relationship, with child labor incidence 
elasticity decreasing as the level of per capita income rises.   
   13 
Figure 1: Child Labor Incidence and GDP per Capita 
This pattern is evident in Africa, where Table 4 (above) shows the incidence of child 
labor significantly higher among the poorest households. However, more recently, micro data 
on the household level have been used to disentangle the income effect from other associated 
factors, including the development of legal and political infrastructure.  The evidence shows 
a surprisingly weak correlation between child labor and household income once these other 
factors are taken into account (Edmonds, 2003; Bhalotra and Heady, 2000; Rogers and 
Swinnerton, 2001). 
•  There is a lot of evidence confirming the adverse impact of child labor on educational 
attainment.  A significant proportion of children are simultaneously working and enrolled 
in school.  While the evidence on the effect of child labor on school enrolment is not very 
strong, there is evidence of a strong negative effect on school attendance, test scores, and 
grade completion (Orazem and Gunnarsson, 2003). This has important ramifications for 
achieving Education for All (see Box 2).  On the other hand, as we will emphasize below, 
household decisions regarding children’s activities are also affected by the relative 
returns to education, compared to returns from child labor activities (Ravaillon and 
Wodon, 2000;  Ilahi, 2001). A closely related issue is mothers’ education as an important 
determinants of children’s activities (See Table 4 on Africa).    14 
 
Box 2: The Challenge of Education for All 
 
An estimated 104 million children are currently without any access to primary schooling, of whom 
56% are girls.  South Asia and East Asia account for almost half of these children though, if current 
trends prevail, by 2015 more than half of out-of-school children will be African.  An estimated 130 
million children worldwide do not attend school regularly.  Many of these children do not attend 
school because they are working.   
 
Worldwide access to primary schooling has increased modestly in recent years. Both gross and net 
primary enrollment rates increased by 2 percentage points worldwide between 1990 and 2000, and by 
the same amount in developing countries.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, gross enrollment rates increased by 
7 percentage points while net enrollment increased by 3 percentage points. Some countries achieved 
dramatic progress in expanding enrollments, improving schooling retention and completion rates, and 
reducing gender disparities.  Enrollments in Uganda, Malawi, and Mauritania doubled between 1995 
and 2000.  These are positive trends, but unevenly distributed, and the scale of the EFA challenge 
remains huge. One child in four drops out without completing 5 years of basic education.  Some 600 
million women and 300 million men remain illiterate, and their children, as a group, are far less likely 
to be schooled than others.  Enrollment rates in many countries are stagnant.  At present trends, as 
many as 86 countries will fail to meet the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary 
completion by 2015. 
 
Girls’ enrollment trends have generally been positive.  The annual EFA Global Monitoring Report for 
2003-04 shows a consistent narrowing of the gender gap.  The gender parity index (GPI) worldwide 
in 1991, for instance, was 0.89.  By 2000, it had increased to 0.93.  Most of this gain was in 
developing countries, where the GPI increased from 0.87 in 1991 to 0.92 in 2000.  Nevertheless, the 
gains are slow, and about 14 million more girls than boys were out of primary school in 2000. 
 
 
4. Understanding Child Labor 
While recognizing that child labor is influenced by various social and cultural factors, 
in this brief section we present an economic framework for understanding child labor. This 
allows us to shed light on important aspects of child labor, and offers a useful guide to policy 
in this arena.  We use household decision-making as the unit of analysis. Following Bhalotra 
(2000) and Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003), we describe a framework where children work 
instead of going to school because of some combination of the following: (i) incentives favor 
work, (ii) constraints compel children to w ork, and/or (iii) decisions are not made in the 
child’s best interest (agency problem). 
The incentives problem arises when the economic benefits of a child working will be 
greater than expected benefits of schooling.  In these cases, then, parents can be making    15 
economically rational decisions in sending their children to work. This situation – in effect, 
where the ratio of the net returns to education relative to work is negative -- will typically 
arise where education is too costly or offers little benefit.  High costs can refer to either direct 
or opportunity costs of education.  Direct costs may be high because of access issues: for 
example, fees may be expensive or transportation may be costly because schools are far 
away. Opportunity costs may be high when children are needed for non-school activities that 
are critical for household welfare (e.g., helping with the harvest, fetching water). On the 
other side of the cost-benefit equation, the returns to education may be low because of quality 
issues such as a lack of teaching materials, poor curricula, or inadequately trained teachers.  
Even when expected returns to education are favorable, and parents have an 
economic incentive to send their children to school, they might not be able to afford the 
current costs of schooling (including opportunity costs stemming from the income losses for 
children not working). Parents may be constrained from sending their children to school 
because of poverty or insurmountable short-term economic concerns.  The direct costs of 
schooling may simply be unaffordable for chronically poor families or for families that are in 
a situation of transitory poverty because of a shock (e.g., job loss of a parent, drought, etc.).  
In a world of perfect markets, parents could borrow against the future income gains from the 
higher human capital of their children to finance current education expenditures. However, 
such instruments are normally not available, especially for poor or otherwise vulnerable 
families lacking collateral. In fact, f or some households, child labor constitutes the only 
mechanism for intertemporal allocation of resources (i.e., using child labor to borrow from 
the future for present consumption). Imperfect labor markets may also pose constraints for 
households. Monitoring costs (and incomplete contracts) can make the employment of non-
family members costly and lead households to use the labor of their own children as an 
alternative.
4 
The agency problem arises when children go to work instead of school because 
parents or others making decisions for them do not act in their interests. In some cases, the  
                                                 
4 In fact, one of the puzzles of the literature has been the finding that child labor increases with land ownership. 
This “wealth effect” is not what one would expect when child labor is seen as driven primarily by poverty.   16 
problem may be informational  – i.e., parents are unaware of the economic benefits of 
education. In other cases, parents may simply not act altruistically relative to their children. 
Finally, a growing number of children have been orphaned or separated from their families 
because of HIV/AIDS and/or conflict.  As a result, these children do not have parents or 
anyone else to act on their behalf. 
5. Policy Options 
Understanding why children work is essential for designing appropriate interventions 
that reduce child labor and increase educational attendance.  As discussed in the preceding 
section, parents face a variety of incentives and constraints in making choices on behalf of 
their children. In some cases, children do not have parents or other altruistic agents to make 
appropriate decisions for them nor are they given the right to participate in an decisions. 
Child labor may also result from market failures that can be addressed through public policy. 
Each of these problems has different policy implications so it is important to understand the 
relevance of each in any real situation in considering policy responses. 
An additional aspect of public policy in the area of child labor concerns providing 
protection and services to children who are working.  This is a controversial issue, since this 
line of discussion might be interpreted as explicitly accepting child labor.  However, as we 
have seen, child labor remains essential for  some families and, at any rate, will not be 
eliminated immediately.  Thus, policy-makers need to be concerned with enforcing 
workplace health and safety and other labor standards, making educational and health 
services accessible to child workers, and offering vocational training and rehabilitation 
services.  In addition to these interventions, all efforts should be made to remove children 
from hazardous and other worst forms of child labor. 
Table 5 summarizes the policy options associated with the incentive, constraint, and 
agency issues. In the following sub-sections, we consider these in greater detail.   17 
Table 5: Examples of Policy Approaches to Address Child Labor and School 
Attendance 
 
Improving incentives for 
children to go to school 
Removing constraints 
stopping children from going 
to school 
Using legislation to encourage 
schooling and discourage 
labor  
- Make school attendance 
more accessible (more 
schools, flexible scheduling) 
- Reduce or eliminate school 
fees 
- Eliminate discrimination 
against girls in school 
- Improve education quality 
(teaching, materials, etc.) 
- Improve basic services (e.g., 
access to clean water) 
- Eliminate wage 
discrimination against children 
(thereby reducing demand for 
child labor) 
- Poverty-reduction strategies 
- Social safety nets 
- Conditional cash or food 
transfers (linked to 
participation in education or 
health services) 
- Financial instruments that 
allow access to credit, 
collaterize assets 
- Better labor market 
functioning 
- Enforce compulsory 
education laws 
- Introduce and enforce 
appropriate child labor laws 
- Enforce labor laws to 
eliminate wage  
discrimination, etc. 
Providing protection and rehabilitation services for working children 
- Remove children from hazardous and worst forms of child labor 
- Enforce health and safety and other employment standards 
- Provide access to education and health services 
- Offer vocational training and other rehabilitation services 
 
 
5.1 Improving Incentives for Schooling 
In developing countries, one in five children aged 6-11 is not in school -- more than 
100 million children in total. In many areas, rural primary school enrollments are below half  
of enrollment rates in urban areas.  The out-of-school rates for children with disabilities are 
up to ten times higher than for the population as a whole. For every four children who are in 
school, one will drop out before completing primary education. The children who do drop out 
of school, in part because of poor teaching and learning conditions, are predominantly poor, 
generally rural, and disproportionately female  Box 3 shows a wide range across countries in 
terms of persistence in schooling and overall primary completion.   18 
 





In many countries, school enrollment rate 
provides a very different picture from one 
given by the completion rate. In 
Madagascar, for example, 80 percent of 
the students do not manage to complete 
the primary school education despite the 
country’s high enrollment rate. 
 
   
  
 
Educational policies that reduce the costs of education or increase the expected 
returns will shift household incentives away from sending children to work and towards 
sending them to school. Making schools accessible, improving their quality, and reducing 
direct schooling costs can all serve to improve incentives. 
Education may be costly because of inaccessibility. Some children are living in 
remote, underserved areas and do not have reasonable access to school. Only 32% of children 
in rural Senegal, for example, live within walking distance of a school offering the full six-
grade cycle. Available education services may be inaccessible for children with learning or 
other disabilities.  A range of cultural and safety issues may also limit children’s ability to 
seek out schooling opportunities.  Lehman and Buys (2002), working in Chad, found that 
contrary to initial hypotheses, enrollment drops off precipitously for children in satellite 
villages located less than 1 km from a school (Figure 2).  This suggests that it is not just 
physical distance that is the problem, but also cultural distance can affect enrollment. The 
idea of sending one’s child to a “foreign” village may be one of the primary constraints.    19 
















Costs of education can also be high because of fees that are unaffordable for poor 
families. One option is that school be free. Another possibility is that schools serve food 
supplements which, in effect, can create a situation of “negative fees” for the most 
disadvantaged children. As we will see in the next sub-section, various social protection 
interventions can reduce the opportunity costs families can face in sending their children to 
school.  
Poor quality can be a major issue that reduces the expected benefits of education and, 
thus, can be a disincentive to schooling. Schools in many developing regions suffer from 
problems such as overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and under-skilled or apathetic 
teachers.  As a result, parents may see little use in sending their children to school when they 
could be home learning a skill (for example, agriculture) and supplementing family income.  
Enhancing quality t hrough better teachers, curricula and materials, or other reforms can 
increase the expected returns to education and thus increase the incentives for sending 
children to school. Because of the control parents have over the decision-making process, 
their perception of the value of school is a main determinant of child attendance.  Parents 
who are educated understand the importance of schooling from personal experience. 
In 2002, the  Fast Track Initiative (FTI) was launched in an effort to accelerate 
progress toward universal primary education. The FTI built on specific commitments 
expressed by the international community at the Monterrey conference in 2002. This 
involved committing to a boost in development aid in support of the MDGs within a 
GER and Distance, 
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framework of mutual responsibility and accountability in which donors would provide 
additional support to countries implementing sound policies and willing to be held 
accountable for results. This includes a set of key education policy and financing parameters 
which constitute an indicative framework against which countries’ plans may be evaluated 
and monitored (Box 4).  These parameters are explicitly designed to ensure that children are 
able to complete a full program of primary schooling. 
 
Box 4: Policy Benchmarks for Universal Primary Education by 2015* 
Service Delivery 
  Avg. annual teacher salary 
  Pupil-teacher ratio 
  Non Salary spending   
  Average repetition rate 
  Annual hours of instruction 
System Expansion 
  Unit construction cost 
System Financing 
  Government revenues 
  Education spending 
  Primary education spending 
 
 
3.5x per capita GNP 
40:1 
33% of recurrent education spending 
10%  or lower 
850 or more 
 
$10,000 or less 
 
% of GDP  14 percent - 18 percent (depending on p/c GDP) 
20% (as share of Government revenues) 
50% (as share of total education recurrent spending) 
  *    Benchmarks to be applied flexibly on the basis of country circumstances 
 
The FTI countries, as a group, have been moving in a more positive direction over the 
past decade than the developing countries as a whole (Figure 3).  For the first ten FTI 
countries, gross enrolment rates (GER) averaged an increase of 33 percentage points, while 
primary completion rates (PCR) averaged 14 percentage point gains.   
   21 






























































































































* Note: For Gambia and Honduras, PCR start year is 1991; for Nicaragua, 1988.  For Honduras, 1991; for 
Yemen, 1993. For purposes of comparability, Mauritania figures reflect Gr.5 completion (primary cycle 
changed from 5 to 7 years in 2000). 
**Note: For Guyana, PCR MRY is 1999; for Mauritania, Honduras, and Guinea, 2001; for the Gambia and 
Yemen, 2000.  For Burkina Faso, GER MRY is 2003; for Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger and Yemen, 2000; and for Guyana, 1999. 
Source:  World Bank, February 2004 
 
These positive outcomes suggest that, with sufficient political support both in country 
and from the donor community, the goal of universal primary completion is attainable for 
most countries within the time frames suggested.  This will also represent an important step 
in moving towards eradication of child labor. 
5.2 Removing Constraints through Better Social Protection 
As we have noted, children sometimes go to work, not because there is no incentive 
to send them to school but because of constraints families face in doing so. These constraints 
can stem from chronic poverty or from shocks of a more transitory nature – in either case, 
families sometimes are compelled to make decisions that may be necessary for the short run 
but are sub-optimal in terms of their long-run welfare. Instruments that can effectively 
support families in managing risks related to poverty and other forms of vulnerability can 
reduce or eliminate these obstacles and give families choices beyond resorting to sending 
their children to work. This management of social risk is the task for social protection.  
  Social risk management includes market-based and informal arrangements (such as 
access to financial assets and insurance, and extended families), as well as public measures   22 
(World Bank 2001). Table 6 identifies some examples in each of these categories that can 
help families manage risks that might otherwise lead to child labor. These can involve ex-
ante (risk reduction or risk mitigation) strategies or ex-post (coping) strategies. Faced with a 
shock – for example, job loss or disability of a breadwinner or a bad harvest -  families may 
have to consider putting a child to work. However, there may be other household strategies, 
such as having the insurance of other adult earners or relying on savings or transfers from 
extended family to make up for the lost income. Studies from countries as different as 
Russia, the Philippines, and Kyrgyzstan have found that private transfers and savings are 
very important for families to cope with shocks. Some forms of social protection can be 
provided by financial markets in the form of private insurance (e.g., crop insurance, disability 
insurance) or in the form of credit instruments that allow families to cope with temporary 
income loss.    
 
Table 6: Managing the Risks that can Lead to Child Labor 
 
  Informal, household  Market  Public 
Risk reduction      Good economic 
policies 
Good labor market 
policies (including 
labor standards) 





Social insurance plans 




Borrowing instruments  Social safety nets 
Good financial market 
policies 
  
While such informal and market-based arrangements can provide social protection to 
families, they are, by themselves, insufficient. So public measures are a critical source of 
social protection in terms of helping families to deal with obstacles that might prevent them 
from sending their children to school. These include good economic and labor market 
policies that encourage growth, reduce poverty, and thus reduce the likelihood that families 
will be vulnerable to risks that might force them to put their children to work. In addition to a 
role in reducing risk, public policies and interventions can provide families with instruments 
that help them insure themselves against shocks such as job loss, disability, or crop failure.   23 
This can happen either through providing an effective and efficient framework for regulating 
privately-provided insurance or through directly providing the insurance, as in the case of 
unemployment insurance. In some cases, for example, pensions and disability insurance, 
governments may play both roles. 
In situations where risks that may lead to child labor cannot be prevented or insured 
against, families wind up coping through various means (including child labor). Public safety 
nets are important here and, when effective, can offer families alternatives beyond sending 
children to work. Virtually all countries have some safety net programs in place, although the 
extent, sophistication, and effectiveness varies considerably. In many countries, these 
programs are in need of reform if they are going to offer the necessary support.
5  
However, there are many successful programs around the world, and different options 
for useful interventions. Public works, or workfare, programs have probably been the most 
widely used type of safety-net intervention in low-income countries. When designed well, 
these programs offer needed income (or food, in some cases) to poor households and can 
help them smooth consumption, without having to rely on strategies such as child labor.
6 
Public works can also build needed badly-needed infrastructure in underdeveloped areas, 
such as roads, schools, and health clinics, that will directly increase access to education. 
Social funds in many countries have played a similar role. 
Conditional transfers represent a type of safety net program with particular relevance 
to reducing child labor and increasing school attendance. These programs tie cash or, in some 
cases, food transfers to poor families that meet specific conditions such as sending children 
to school. They have been used most widely in Latin America.
7  One of that region’s best 
known conditional cash transfer programs is Mexico’s Progresa, which links cash grants and 
nutritional supplements to school and clinic attendance (Box 5). Evaluations have shown that 
this  program has reduced child labor and increased education levels among the poor. 
                                                 
5 Problems vary. In some cases, spending is too low to make much of a difference. In others, timing is the main 
problem – i.e., where countries cannot or do not increase spending in periods when need increases (e.g., crisis, 
recession). Sometimes implementation is the problem. For example, programs are poorly targeted, efforts are 
too fragmented among many programs, and interventions are not sufficiently evaluated in terms of their 
effectiveness.    
6 For a review of the experience with public works, see Subbarao (2003). 
7 There may be other conditions  – e.g., attendance at health clinics. For a review of conditional cash/food 
transfers in Latin America, see Rawlings and Rubio (2003).   24 
Bangladesh has had an innovative Food for Education program, which provided a free 
monthly ration of rice or wheat to poor families if their children attend primary school. 
Turkey has recently introduced a conditional cash transfer as part of a comprehensive 
initiative to increase school attendance and to improve health care utilization of children.   
 
 
Box 5: Mexico’s Progresa Program    
 
Progresa is a major program in Mexico aimed at developing the human capital of poor households.  
The program  provides monetary transfers to families that are contingent upon their children’s regular 
attendance at school. The benefit levels are intended to offset the opportunity costs of not sending 
children to school and increase with the grade level in school—recognizing that the opportunity cost 
of children’s time increases as they grow older. In order to ensure the gender lags in secondary 
enrollment are reversed, it offers higher transfers for girls than for boys attending secondary school.  
Evaluation of the program indicates that it  has significantly increased  the enrollment of boys and 
girls, particularly of girls, and particularly ,at the secondary level. The results imply that the children 
will have an average of 0.7 years of extra schooling because of Progresa, although this effect may 
increase if children are more likely to go on to senior high school as a result of the program. 
 
 
In many developing countries, especially low-income ones, resources available for 
conditional transfer programs and other types of safety nets are limited. As a result, targeting 
is very important if public policy is going to be successful. Effective safety nets targeted on 
the poor and most vulnerable is absolutely essential if these families are going to have 
choices to invest in their children.
8  
5.3 Addressing Agency Problems and Market Failure 
Thus far, we have argued that the supply of child labor is a decision made at the 
household level based on incentives and constraints. Here, the government can only 
indirectly influence the decision-making process through provision of better, more accessible 
schools or social protection interventions such as conditional cash transfers. In this section 
we discuss the use of legal instruments, namely, setting a minimum age for employment, 
banning child labor or certain forms of child labor, and/or establishing mandatory education.  
                                                 
8 Disability provides a good example. With about 10 % of the world’s people disabled and only 5 % of disabled 
children receiving formal education world-wide, the education for all goal is out of reach unless special support 
to this vulnerable group is given   
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There is considerable debate about the effectiveness of legislative interventions in the 
fight against child labor. In the worst case, sudden dismissal of children from work in 
relatively safe, well-remunerated jobs can lead poor children into considerably more 
dangerous and hidden worst forms of child labor. In the best case, legal bans on child labor 
can reduce the supply of and demand for child labor, raising wages for adults and increasing 
household income, making child labor unnecessary. There are no guarantees, however, that 
bans on child labor will have significant impact on reducing the incidence of child labor. 
Before exploring the conditions in which legal mechanisms are likely to have the most effect, 
it is important to emphasize that the worst forms of child labor should be banned in every 
circumstance. State authorities ought to do all in their power to enforce laws protecting 
children from the exploitative circumstances identified in ILO Convention 182.  
The first child labor law was passed in Britain in 1802. The 200-year history of 
attempts to eliminate child labor by legislative fiat since then shows mixed results. Basu 
(quoted in Srivastava and Raj, 2000) reviews the literature and finds examples where bans on 
child labor played an important role in its elimination, such as in the cotton mills of 
Manchester. In other cases, however, dramatic reductions in child labor were achieved with 
no legislative intervention (e.g. Belgium in the 19
th century). The decline in the incidence of 
child labor between 1880–1920 in industrialized countries is thought to be due to both 
economic and legal reasons, with the former predominating.  
Governments almost universally have laws establishing a minimum age for 
employment, banning certain types of child labor, and requiring attendance at school. The 
international human rights instruments discussed in Section 2 offer important guidance for 
these laws. Nonetheless, a recent comparative review of child labor legislation by the OECD 
found many examples of child labor laws that were unclear, fragmented, or inconsistent with 
compulsory education laws (OECD, 2003).  
Furthermore, given the incentives  and constraints influencing household behavior 
discussed in previous sections, we know that such laws are not always sufficient for 
preventing child labor. There are various scenarios, however, in which legal interventions 
can be expected to play a critical role in reducing child labor. Three such cases are discussed 
below.   26 
The first concerns the problem of children’s agency. Much of the economic analysis 
on child labor assumes that (a) parents are making the decision about whether to send a child 
to work and (b) that parents act altruistically, that is, in the best interest of the child. There 
are circumstances in which neither may be the case. When adults are exploiting children, 
legal bans on child labor or mandatory schooling policies can raise child welfare. This also 
applies in situations where the parents may not have full information about the long term 
returns to education versus work. Laws related to child labor are also particularly important 
in areas affected by conflict or HIV/AIDS, when children find themselves as heads of 
households or in the care of non-parent adults or institutions who may not act in their best 
interest.  
In the other two scenarios, banning child labor and requiring school attendance are 
important interventions to correct for market failure.
9 In the first case, individual households 
decide to send their children to work instead of school in order to earn a certain subsistence 
level of household income. Assuming that children and adults are perfectly substitutable in 
the labor market, the aggregate effect – on wages as well as human capital development – of 
individual households sending children to work instead of school is socially sub-optimal. 
Government intervention in the form of child labor laws can correct for this externality. A 
ban on child labor which effectively reduces the demand for and supply of child labor could 
raise adult wages sufficiently to increase household income above subsistence levels. In this 
case, the “bad equilibrium” characterized by low wages and high incidence of child labor is 
replaced by a “good equilibrium” characterized by high wages and low incidence of child 
labor (Basu, 1999).   
Likewise, a ban on child labor can correct the market failure that arises when 
employers prefer to hire children instead of adults because they can do so at a lower price. 
The gap in wages between children and adults due to differences in productivity will not 
provide enough motivation for employers to hire children instead of adults.  However, in 
                                                 
9 Basu (1999) identifies an additional justification for banning child labor on the basis of fundamental 
preferences. He defines a household choice as “fundamental” if it can be agreed that no one should have to pay 
a price for having such a preference. He then notes that households that choose not to send children to work 
may pay a price vis a vis those who do in the form of reduced adult wages due to the additional supply of 
(child) labor in the market. Because households ought not pay a price for having a fundamental preference, a 
legal ban on child labor may be justified.    27 
some cases, employment of children is driven by employer desire to exploit, that is, pay 
wages lower than  the marginal productivity of child workers, who have less power to 
negotiate wages, individually or collectively. Here, laws against child labor can be an 
important policy tool.  
Even in these cases where legal intervention can be expected to reduce the incidence 
of child labor, implementation may be problematic. Child labor laws are very difficult to 
enforce for a number of reasons: labor inspectorates are under-resourced; most child laborers 
work in rural areas far from inspectors; many children are in inaccessible workplaces such as 
domestic homes and unregistered establishments. Compulsory education is often seen as a 
more effective legislative avenue for addressing child labor as it is easier to ensure the 
presence of children in schools than to enforce their absence from work (Srivastava and Raj, 
2000).  
In some circumstances, legal efforts to ban child labor, potentially even those derived 
from ILO Convention 138 which establishes minimum ages for employment, may  actually 
reduce child welfare. When concerns about child labor in developing countries began to 
attract attention in North America and Europe, many consumer advocates and activists called 
for banning imports of products made with child labor or boycotting companies using child 
labor in their supply chains. Fearing sanctions from key trading partners, the Bangladesh 
garment industry conducted a sweep of factories and threw 50,000 children out of work. 
According to UNICEF, the children, mostly girls under age 14, ended up in more dangerous 
jobs with less pay.  
While media, consumer, and activist attention has focused on child labor in export 
industries, well-meaning efforts at removing children from work in the domestic market can 
have unintended consequences as well. The Child Labor Deterrence Act in India established 
fines for employers, making the employment of children more costly. The wages of working 
children thus dropped causing either more children in the household to work or those already 
working to work more hours (Basu and Tzannatos, 2003).   
ILO Convention 182 recognizes that efforts to end child labor work best when linked 
to comprehensive measures to combat poverty and promote education.  Countries ratifying 
this convention are required to take immediate and effective measures to secure the   28 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as a matter of urgency.  The 
Time-Bound Programme (TBP) approach constitutes one of the means put in place by the 
ILO to assist countries in fulfilling their obligations under the convention.  TBPs are 
designed as a comprehensive framework that governments can use to chart a course of action 
with well-defined targets.  They comprise a set of integrated and coordinated policies and 
interventions with clear goals, specific targets and a defined time frame, aimed at preventing 
and eliminating a country’s worst forms of child labor.  They emphasize the need to address 
the root causes of child labor, linking action for the latter’s elimination to national 
development policy, macro-economic trends and strategies, and demographic and labor 
market processes and outcomes, with particular emphasis on economic and social policies to 
combat poverty and to promote universal basic education and social mobilization.  El 
Salvador, Nepal, and Tanzania are the first three countries to implement TBPs.  Three other 
countries, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and the Philippines, started implementation 
during 2002-03. 
6. Conclusion 
Child labor is a significant phenomenon, large in scope, and with very important 
social and economic implications. It takes a variety of forms, from children working on 
family farms or in family businesses to children engaged in sweatshop labor, prostitution, 
armed conflict, or other illicit activity.  It also has serious implications on human capital 
accumulation and in perpetuating poverty and therefore is closely linked to progress against 
the MDGs, especially the goal of achieving universal primary  education. Given the 
connections between child labor and schooling, the efforts of the Education For All 
partnership will not be fully successful without addressing child labor. 
An economic framework, such as the one presented in this paper, based on household 
decision-making – specifically regarding the school/work choice for children – is an effective 
tool for understanding the phenomenon of child labor and targeting policies that can address 
it. Children work for different reasons.  In some cases, families have a greater incentive to 
put children to work than to send them to school because the expected returns to education 
are less than the returns to work.  In other cases, economic returns may favor school but 
families are unable to educate their children because of various obstacles or constraints.    29 
These most often apply to poor or vulnerable families that cannot afford the direct costs of 
education or the opportunity costs of losing the labor of their children.  Still other cases of 
child labor stem from the fact that children do not have parents or some other agent acting in 
their interest. 
These different circumstances point to the need for multi-sectoral approaches to child 
labor and increasing school participation.  Where incentives are the problem  because 
expected returns are greater for work than school, educational reforms are the most important 
policy instrument.  The goals of these reforms should focus on reducing the costs of 
education, increasing the quality and hence the returns to education, or both.  Where the 
problem is that poor or vulnerable families face constraints in sending their children to 
school, social protection interventions that provide a safety net or overcome failures in 
financial or labor markets are the key.  There is also room for child labor and compulsory 
school attendance legislation to play an important role.  This approach is especially relevant 
where children face an “agency” problem or when labor market imperfections result in wage 
discrimination or a socially unfavorable substitution of child labor for adult labor. 
The international human rights instruments we described relating to child labor and 
the right to education have effectively raised awareness about child labor and have helped 
mobilize significant resources and political will to address the issue.  ILO Convention 182, in 
particular, reflects the lessons learned over the last three decades about the causes and effects 
of child labor.  In appreciating the reality of low income countries and severe constraints 
faced by poor households, the Convention prioritizes urgent action against the worst forms of 
child labor and promotes a pragmatic and multi-sectoral approach, with flexibility for 
developing countries to adapt policy interventions in line with country-level circumstances 
and priorities.  Such an approach is fully consistent with the economic analysis presented in 
this paper.   
Finally, the Oslo Agenda for Action, unanimously adopted at the 1997 International 
Conference on Child Labour, lays out the priorities for the international community to 
address child labor. The Agenda specifically identified the crucial need for better information 
on the child labor phenomenon, its extent and nature, its causes and consequences, and the 
effectiveness of policies and program to address it.  The Oslo Conference also articulated the   30 
need to strengthen cooperation and coordination among the international development 
agencies in the child labor field. There was a general recognition in Oslo that, despite a 
common policy framework (in the form of ILO Conventions No. 138 and No. 182, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Millennium Development 
Goals), action on child labor was poorly coordinated across agencies. As a result, the many 
potential synergies in the agencies’ work in the child labor field were unexploited. The 
World Bank has responded to these calls by forging partnerships with the ILO and UNICEF 
to address the challenge of child labor.    31 
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